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Our research-in-progress uses Adaptive Structuration Theory to explain the evolving characteristics of cyber-crime –
specifically, the increasing use of computing and networking technology by criminals to facilitate financial fraud and theft.
Our goal is to understand the processes by which the perpetrators of cyber-crime form technology-based social networks.
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INTRODUCTION
This study explores the use of Adaptive Structuration Theory (AST) as a basis for explaining the evolving characteristics of
cyber-crime – specifically, the increasing use of computing and networking technology to facilitate financial fraud and theft.
In the context of our research, cyber-crime involves individuals from various nations, who are illegally exchanging money,
merchandise and information within a collaborative computer-based social network.  Our goal is to understand the processes
by which the perpetrators of cyber-crime form technology-based social networks to respond and adapt 1) to technological
change, and 2) to the changing tactics of law enforcement officials.  In so doing, we ultimately seek to provide insights for
business and regulatory decision makers, as well as recommendations regarding the types of strategies that might be effective
in confronting this type of cyber-crime.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES IN RE-SHIPPING
In order to provide a context for our analysis, we present two cases of cyber-crime involving re-shipping.  These cases
describe typical social networks involving cyber-criminal activity and the groups involved, as well as the processes and
response strategies of both perpetrators and law enforcement.  Re-shipping involves technologically-skilled individuals, often
distributed internationally, who form social networks tied together through the internet.  Essentially, the objective of these
groups is to steal credit card numbers or bank account information, order merchandise for delivery to temporary addresses in
the US, and re-ship the merchandise to middlemen.  The middlemen in turn sell the merchandise and send the proceeds
electronically back to participants in the criminal network.
The first case involves an investigation in Pennsylvania, which began with a tip from a local United Parcel Service (UPS)
driver to the State Police.  The driver noticed a sudden flood of merchandise being shipped to different addressees in the
same apartment.  After some investigation the state police arrested two Belarus natives.  The state police charged them with
receiving stolen property, but soon recognized the international nature of the crime and subsequently offered the case to the
United States Secret Service (USSS).  Prior to their arrest, one of the suspects’ Belarus contacts had provided him with false
identification, after which he began cashing stolen checks and reshipping merchandise overseas.  In an attempt to stay ahead
of law enforcement, the suspect would move from city to city every few weeks, but was ultimately unsuccessful.
The second case involves an American man recruited to do reshipping through an online game chat room.  He agreed, but
subsequently reconsidered his involvement and contacted the Pittsburgh USSS office.  The USSS in turn directed him to
contact the suspect and change the re-shipping address to a USSS-controlled location.  The USSS corresponded with the
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suspect via email and instant messaging, discovered that he was from Eastern Europe, and learned that the merchandise sent
to them was to be re-shipped to a business in the western U.S.
During these transfers the USSS was able to capture an IP address that matched the country where they had believed the
suspect was located.  They also executed search warrants on his U.S. based email provider which provided further
information about his operation.  From the emails they learned that the suspect was being paid by a third-party company
through a legitimate bank, from which they were able to discover account numbers and amounts transferred.  They learned
that the recipient bank was headquartered in Germany, and started the process of freezing the accounts.  Legally, the U.S. can
freeze assets from another country’s bank without its consent, but this can be politically problematic and is usually not done
without approval from senior officials in the U.S. government.
In this regard, the participation of foreign governments and law enforcement introduces additional stakeholders with goals
and objectives that are potentially in opposition to those of U.S. law enforcement.  In this case, the jurisdictional issues can
become problematic.  For example, in this re-shipping case, the suspect’s home country had a history of not cooperating with
U.S. law enforcement, which in turn contributes to the social structure of the criminal enterprise.  Criminals in these types of
countries will sometimes become complacent, believing that even if the U.S. knows who and where they are, their homeland
will protect them.  Surprisingly, this did not happen in this case.  USSS agents were able to contact their counterparts in the
suspect’s country.  They were told that the country in question does not extradite for this type of crime, but that they would
prosecute in their own country – if a case could be built.  Notably, as they were discussing the case, their counterparts in the
suspect’s country were able identify the suspect and confirm the information gained by the USSS.   Increased information
sharing of this type among inter-governmental law enforcement and the financial community tends to help control fraud, such
as reshipping schemes (Swartz, 2005).
THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF CYBER-CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS
The cases presented above describe a problematic social structure in internet-based crime.  Eastern European crime groups
rely solely on the internet, along with the forums where an international open market for recruiting and directing participants
is established.  To succeed in an eastern European crime organization, one simply must be a reliable service or merchandise
provider.  Anyone, including law enforcement, can access these forums to buy credit card numbers and/or pay someone to
send out spam email.  Anonymity and protected identities are the norm.  Because participants tend not to be within
geographic proximity of each other, they generally do not meet their collaborators face-to-face, nor do they know their real
names.  Participants tend to communicate only through fabricated screen names, or ‘nics’.
Victims in turn also are physically separated from individual criminal participants.  While criminals are often based in
Eastern Europe, victims tend to be corporations and individuals in wealthy western nations – particularly in North America
and Western Europe.  Consequently, the criminal and the victim – like the collaborators within the criminal organization –
almost never meet face-to-face and rarely know each other.
The anonymous, virtual nature of this criminal organization poses a significant problem for law enforcement (Naim, 2005).
In ‘traditional’ organized crime, law enforcement deals with names and aliases, and criminal transactions eventually require a
face-to-face encounter.  People generally know their counterparts even if they didn’t deal with them personally.  In this
environment, the standard approach has been to arrest someone at the bottom of the criminal enterprise, ‘flip’ him, and then
have him identify and provide information against the person to whom he answers.  Law enforcement would work this
‘ladder’ approach in hopes of getting to the top.  By contrast, in cyber-crime, people often do not know for whom they are
working for and do not want to know.
In this environment, law enforcement has access only to a nic (which can be changed), an IP address (which can be masked),
and a payment method.  IP addresses are difficult to trace because there are many free proxy services that will route internet
traffic through an intermediary computer.  This means that if law enforcement is fortunate enough to obtain an IP address, it
frequently identifies someone else’s computer.  Furthermore, internet service providers (ISP) tend not to retain IP addresses
for an extended period of time, and even if they do, the information can be difficult to obtain.  It is not unusual for an ISP in
the U.S. to discard records more than two weeks old.  European ISP’s tend to retain their records much longer, but it is much
more difficult for law enforcement agencies to obtain them due to different legal standards, language barriers, and so on.  As
noted, issues involving multiple jurisdictions can complicate investigations.
Payment  methods  also  do  not  provide  the  solid  leads  they  once  did.   The  current  preferred  method of  payment  is  through
online companies that offer universal ‘e-currency’ backed (usually) by gold.  Because these companies are generally located
in countries other than the U.S., and because they do not use any nationally-recognized currency, they can avoid the
regulatory requirements imposed on a standard bank.  For example, the USSS is currently investigating a suspect having an
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account with Webmoney, based in Eastern Europe.  The USSS described sending money to the target’s account as “like
dropping cash into a black hole”.  Furthermore, because the company was not a bank and was not based in the U.S., they
would simply ignore any subpoenas originating from the USSS.  This allowed the suspect to withdraw his funds, perhaps
funnel them through another internet money system, and then withdraw the funds and deposit them into his personal account
– fully laundered.1
ELEMENTS OF ADAPTIVE STRUCTURATION IN INTERNATIONAL CYBER-CRIME
Adaptive Structuration Theory was first proposed by DeSanctis and Poole to explain how the social structure of an
organization evolves through the interaction of groups with computer and networking technologies.  (DeSanctis and Poole,
1994)   A key aspect of these technologies is that they not only provide a basis for automating business tasks, but they also
facilitate interpersonal coordination and information exchange – thus providing the potential for supplementing, changing or
even subsuming the existing social environment of an organization.
The development of AST was motivated in part by a desire to explain the inconsistent performance of early group decision
support systems (GDSS) (Gopal, et. al., 1992-1993).  While many of those systems were successful, many others were not.
It was noted that different groups would use the same technology differently, even when addressing the same task.  This
suggested that group behavior was influenced and constrained, but not determined, by a GDSS.  Conversely, the output of the
GDSS was dependent on the development of a social structure engendered by the complex interaction of users, their tasks,
the encompassing organization, and the technology.
We posit that appropriation of internet technologies by international cyber-criminals is explainable by the same theoretical
constructs used to model the social impact of GDSS.  Specifically, the fraud case described above exemplifies, within the
context of AST, how social structures evolve and adapt to the interactions of the various stakeholders.  Essentially, the
evolution of social structures occurs because of three characteristics of today’s technology.  The first is the availability of the
internet – i.e., a distributed, world-wide communication network.  The second is the transition from a need for face-to-face
communication to one based more on virtual communication.  Virtual communication refers to the capability of groups to
organize in an anonymous, on-line forum, where their physical characteristics and actual identity are unknown.  The third
characteristic is the change from relatively persistent relationships among participants in the criminal network, to
relationships that are more transient and transactional.  Face-to-face relationships create member vulnerabilities, given the
potential for associates to trade information about identities in exchange for favorable treatment by law enforcement.  Thus,
in the traditional criminal organization, participants are motivated to limit the number of individuals involved, which leads to
smaller groups and longer-term relationships.  Conversely, the anonymity of virtual organizations mitigates the risk of
exposure by others.  Thus, membership in the organization tends to be more open, and individual involvement tends to be
based primarily on transactions rather than relationships.
Table 1 summarizes the issues discussed in the cases above.  It describes the structuration of the social network as it
transitions from a traditional financial fraud and theft organization to an international cyber-crime organization, and suggests
how the network changes through group appropriation of internet technologies.
AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This research focuses on the growing international nature of financial fraud, and the increased ease with which criminals are
able to access and transfer stolen financial information and money.  This research seeks to develop a theoretical framework
through which the changes in cyber-criminal tactics engendered by the rise of the internet can be explained and predicted.
We  intend  to  use  Adaptive  Structuration  Theory  as  the  basis  for  future  study.   Although  AST  was  developed  to  explain
GDSS effectiveness, where the systems are primarily commercial and proprietary, we believe that elements of the theory are
generalizable to criminal groups who are using the Internet to collaborate.  Specifically, we will consider how the availability
of the Internet has allowed those involved in financial fraud to appropriate technology in new and changing ways.  We will
also consider how the composition and norms of criminal alliances are evolving in response to emerging technological
features. Finally, we will explore how law enforcement can use both the internet and traditional measures as countermeasures
in the war against international cyber-crime.
1 .  We should note that Webmoney was eventually shut down by its host country as a result of pressure from the E.U. and
other Western nations.
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Table 1: Structuration Elements in the Internet-based Social Network
Traditional Internet-Based
Group Composition • Members of the criminal
organization are known by – and
physically recognizable to – other
participants in the organization
• Membership is relatively stable
given the risk of conspirators
“flipping”, or betraying their
associates
• Members can be known only
through aliases, and are not
physically recognizable to other
participants
• Membership can be more volatile or
fluid given that the actual identity of
a participant can be masked
Group Proximity • Members tend to be located in the
same geographic region.  Although
telephone, fax, and mail
communicate alleviate the need for
face-to-face communication, they do
not facilitate the efficient exchange
of misdirected financial information
• Members can be more easily
distributed.  This facilitates the
formation of international cyber
crime networks that can take
advantage of the bureaucracy and
politics that hinder the efficacy of
law enforcement response
Victim Proximity • Victims tend to be located in the
same geographic region as the
criminal.  If the crime is computer-
base, access to the physical machine
is required.  If the crime is socially-
engineered, victims will recognize
foreign accents and remote mailing
addresses
• Victim proximity tends to be based
upon factors that include the
difficulty of catching the perpetrator,
affluence of the victim, lack of
technical security, and lack of
extradition agreements.   These
factors tend to correlate with the
physical distance between victims
and criminals.
Jurisdiction • Given the close proximity of
criminal group members and
victims, the number of jurisdictions
involved in prosecutions tends to be
smaller
• Given the physical distance
separating group members and
victims, the number of jurisdictions





• Electronic fund transfer
• E-currency
• Payments for goods delivered
• Payments for non-delivery
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